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Abstract 
This paper aims to use the transparency debate within investment arbitration, and 
specifically the discussions of Working Group II when preparing the UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency, as a lens to examine how the international community conceptualises 
investment arbitration. It will argue that investment arbitration is no longer viewed as a 
private system of dispute resolution akin to international commercial arbitration. Rather, 
the public interest, public international law, and regulatory nature of investment 
arbitration is increasingly coming to the fore. Accordingly, the consent of the parties is no 
longer at the heart of arbitral authority. This paper aims to identify what alternate 
theoretical conception of investment arbitration is driving transparency initiatives in 
investment arbitration. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,819 words. 
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International investment law is suffering a legitimacy crisis.1 Countries have withdrawn 
from the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States,2 and proposed investment regimes have come under increasing 
public attack.3 
 
One of the criticisms levelled at international investment law is that dispute resolution 
between foreign investors and host States – investment treaty arbitration (ITA) – is 
secretive and opaque.  In the words of the New York Times:4 
 
Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they 
reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a small group of international tribunals 
handles disputes between investors and foreign governments has led to national laws 
being revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged. 
 
ITA can have significant regulatory and budgetary consequences for the host State, and 
yet the citizens of that State may never be aware of the existence of the dispute. This is 
because ITA occurs under the auspices of international commercial arbitration, a dispute 
resolution mechanism designed to resolve private disputes between private parties, where 
confidentiality is seen as a key benefit.5 
 
One of the responses to the perceived democratic deficit in ITA has been a push for 
greater transparency in ITA proceedings. There have been two components to 
transparency initiatives: first, greater public access to ITA awards, hearings, and other 
documents produced during the course of the arbitration; and second, the opportunity for 
public interest groups to participate in arbitration proceedings as amici curiae.  
  
 
1  Stephan W Schill “International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law – An Introduction” in 
Stephan W Schill (ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) 3 at 6; Kyla Tienhaara “Regulatory Chill and the Threat of 
Arbitration: A View from Political Science” in Chester Brown and Kate Miles Evolution in 
Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 606 at 614. 
2  Schill, above n 1, at 6. 
3  See for example the debate surrounding negotiations of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement: 
Calida Smylie “Calls for Govt to Release Draft Text of TPPA” (1 October 2013) The New Zealand 
Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>; New Zealand Herald “TPPA petition: ‘It’s not democracy’” (1 
October 2013) The New Zealand Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>; Radio Live “Govt Urged to Walk 
Away from TPPA” (5 October 2013) 3 News <www.3news.co.nz>. 
4  Anthony de Palma “NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, But Go 
Too Far, Critics Say” (The New York Times, 11 March 2001). 
5  Expert Report of Stephen Bond Esq (in Esso/BHP v Plowman) (1995) 11 Arbit Intl 273. 
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There have been substantial transparency reforms within the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) regime and within the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). Both now provide for significantly more public access to 
ITA than is the case under commercial arbitration procedural rules. Most recently, in July 
2013 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) finalised 
its preparation of Rules on Transparency for use in ITA under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, which will come into effect from 1 April 2014. 
 
There has been significant debate over the appropriateness of greater transparency within 
ITA. While some believe that it is necessary in order to recognise the legitimate and 
substantial public interest in ITA, others argue that transparency is inappropriate in any 
arbitration, where the interests of the parties should be paramount.6 
 
The disagreement over transparency in ITA is one facet of a broader debate about the 
nature of ITA. Is it a private system of dispute resolution designed to further the interests 
of the parties to the dispute, or is it a public system of adjudication which should take into 
account the broader societal interests which might be affected by the award?7  
 
This paper aims to use the transparency debate, and specifically the discussions of 
Working Group II (WGII) when preparing the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, as a 
lens to examine how the international community conceptualises ITA. It will argue that 
ITA is no longer viewed as a private system of dispute resolution akin to international 
commercial arbitration. Rather, the public interest, public international law, and 
regulatory nature of ITA is increasingly coming to the fore. Accordingly, the consent of 
the parties is no longer at the heart of arbitral authority. This paper aims to identify what 
alternate theoretical conception of ITA is driving international transparency initiatives in 
ITA. 
 
  
 
6  See for example Santiago Dussan Laverde “Analysis of the Principle of Transparency with Special 
Reference to its Implications for the Procedure of International Investment Arbitration” (2011) 11 
Criterio Juridico 105; Anibal Sabater “Towards Transparency in Arbitration (A Cautious 
Approach)” (2010) 5 Berkeley J Intl L Publicist 47.  
7  See Alex Mills “The Public-Private Dualities of International Investment Law and Arbitration” in 
Chester Brown and Kate Miles Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 97; Zachary Douglas “The Hybrid Foundations of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration” in The British Yearbook of International Law 2003 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2003) 151.  
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Part I of this paper will explore the principal arguments in the transparency debate, and 
establish the key differences between international commercial arbitration and ITA. It 
will then discuss movements towards transparency within the NAFTA regime and in the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
 
Scholars of international arbitration have conceptualised ITA in numerous different ways. 
Part II of this paper will introduce a number of theories of ITA: ITA as contract-based 
arbitration; ITA as public law regulatory review; ITA as a form of global administrative 
law; and ITA as international law adjudication. It will discuss what these different 
theories reveal about ITA, and evaluate the extent to which they can explain the 
movement towards transparency in ITA. 
 
Part III of this paper will introduce the recently finalised UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency, and discuss the impetus for their creation. It will examine the form of the 
transparency rules and how they will apply to ITA under the UNCITRAL Rules in the 
future. 
 
Parts IV to VII of the paper will explore the specific provisions of the transparency rules 
on publication, third party participation, public hearings, and exceptions to the 
transparency rules. They will discuss how the deliberations of WGII led to the provisions 
ultimately adopted, and they will assess the likely effectiveness of the transparency rules. 
They will also examine what the deliberations of WGII reveal about how the international 
community is conceptualising ITA. 
 
Finally, Part VIII will utilise the material introduced in previous sections to draw some 
conclusions on what is the predominant theory of ITA within the international 
community.  
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I Transparency in ITA 
A Arbitration Historically 
The traditional conception of arbitration is that it is private and party-controlled. Parties 
are free to determine by agreement all aspects of how their dispute will be settled, 
including what – if any – information is made public.8 Confidentiality is seen as a key 
benefit of arbitration, serving to expedite dispute settlement and protect sensitive 
information and the reputation of the parties.9 Parties to arbitration expect it to be private 
and confidential.10 A commercial arbitration might run its course without public 
disclosure of even the existence of the dispute.11  
 
In recent years there has been debate over whether arbitration gives rise to an obligation 
of confidence.12 In Esso v Plowman, the High Court of Australia found that a private 
arbitration does not necessarily give rise to an obligation of confidentiality on the part of 
the parties.13 United States courts have also refused to protect the confidentiality of 
arbitration communications in the context of requests for discovery of arbitration 
documents.14 In New Zealand, any doubt on this question was resolved when a duty of 
confidentiality in arbitration was codified in section 14B of the New Zealand Arbitration 
Act 1996.15 
  
 
8 Dora Marta Gruner “Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration: The Need for 
Procedural and Structural Reform” (2003) 41 Colum J Transnatl L 923. 
9 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development “Transparency and Third Party 
Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures” OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment (2005, OECD Publishing) at [3]; Fulvio Fracassi “Confidentiality and 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations” (2001) 2 Chi J Intl L 213 at 213. 
10  Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1991] 2 All ER 890 (CA) at 899; Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, above n 9, at [3]; Dimitrij Euler “UNCITRAL Working Group II Standards in 
Treaty Based Investor-State Arbitration: How do they Relate to Existing International Investment 
Treaties?” (2012) 12 Asper Rev Intl Bus & Trade L 139 at 140; Alexis Mourre “Are Amici Curiae 
the Proper Response to the Public’s Concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?”(2006) 5 
Law & Prac Intl Cts & Tribunals 257 at 258. 
11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 9, at [3]. 
12  See the discussion in Gary B Born International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Wolters Kluwer, 
The Netherlands, 2012) at §10.02. 
13  Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10. 
14
  United States v Panhandle Eastern Corp 118 FRD 346 (D Del 1988); Contship Container lines Ltd 
v PPG Industries Inc WL 1948807 (SDNY, April 23, 2003); see generally Richard C Reuben 
“Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth” (2006) 54 U Kan L Rev 1255. 
15  Arbitration Act 1996, s 14B; Amokura Kawharu “New Zealand’s Arbitration Law Receives a Tune-
Up: A Review of Recent Amendments to the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996” (2008) 24 
Arbitration International 405.  
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B ITA is different to Commercial Arbitration 
Although ITA shares most procedural features with international commercial 
arbitration,16 many scholars have distinguished ITA from international commercial 
arbitration for a number of reasons. 
 
1 ITA involves a State  
First, ITA necessarily involves a State as a party. Andrew Tuck argues that the very 
presence of a State changes the nature of the arbitration. Citizens and residents of that 
State have a legitimate interest in knowing how the government acts during the 
arbitration and in the outcome of the arbitration.17 Furthermore, ITA will impact the 
citizens of the State as well as the State itself: ITA may necessitate changes in regulation 
or policy, and it may have significant budgetary repercussions for the public purse.18 
 
This is also true, however, of commercial arbitration involving a State. The good 
governance considerations that mandate public access to arbitration also apply to 
arbitration involving a State born of contractual obligations. This commercial arbitration 
may also impact State policy and the public purse. Accordingly, the mere presence of a 
State in ITA is not sufficient to distinguish it from commercial arbitration. 
 
There are a number of factors which differentiate ITA from other arbitration involving a 
state. First, the nature of the State’s consent is different. In commercial arbitration, the 
parties enter a contractual agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute. Consent to ITA, on 
the other hand, is established through the State’s offer to arbitrate (usually found in an 
investment treaty)19 and the investor’s acceptance of that offer.20 Consent to ITA is 
therefore entered into by the State through the sovereign act of entering into a treaty. 21 It 
is a general and prospective consent, which might catch any future dispute with any 
  
 
16 Dussan Laverde, above n 6, at107; Schill, above n 1, at 14. 
17  Andrew P Tuck “Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and 
Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” (2007) 13 L and Bus Rev of the 
Americas 885 at 912. 
18  Fracassi, above n 9, at 220. 
19  Sometimes the State’s offer to arbitrate may be found in national legislation: see Gus Van Harten 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 24. 
20  Van Harten says that the investor’s consent “has no meaning in the absence of the original consent 
of the state” – at 68. 
21  At 127. 
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foreign investor, rather than consent to arbitrate disputes arising out of a particular 
contractual relationship.22  
 
Secondly, unlike commercial arbitration, ITA engages the regulatory relationship existing 
between a State and an investor subject to its laws.23 The relationship between the 
disputing parties is not a private contractual one. ITA often involves questions of the 
scope and limits of the host State’s regulatory powers, and challenges sovereign actions 
undertaken by the State.24 
 
2 ITA is based in international law 
ITA claims are based on obligations owed by States under an international investment 
agreement (IIA) concluded with other States.25 This means that the law governing the 
dispute is international law, which allows the investor to challenge the domestic 
legislation and regulation of States to a greater extent than in commercial arbitration, as 
the State is unable to rely on the domestic lawfulness of its actions to excuse breaches of 
international obligations. This is distinct from commercial arbitration, where the 
obligations owed between the parties were freely negotiated as part of a contractual 
relationship.26 
 
3 Precedent in ITA 
While there exists no strict system of precedent in arbitration, ITA awards are persuasive 
and as a result may affect parties to a wholly unrelated dispute.27 Investors and states 
expect ITA tribunals to follow past arbitral decisions, and those expectations influence 
the way the case is argued in front of the tribunal.28 In turn, that influences the tribunal, 
such that decisions are situated within a framework of past decisions.29 The development 
of a system of persuasive awards has caused States to take tribunal decisions into account 
when drafting and negotiating future IIAs.30 
  
 
22  At 24; Schill, above n 1, at 15. 
23  Schill, above n 1, at 14-15. 
24  At 1; Fracassi, above n 9, at 220. 
25  Norbert Horn “Current Use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the Context of Investment 
Arbitration” (2008) 24 Arb Intl 587 at 591. 
26  Schill, above n 1, at 15. 
27 At 18. 
28 At 18-19. 
29 At 19. 
30 At 20-23. 
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C The Transparency Debate 
These distinguishing features of ITA have sparked a debate about the need for greater 
transparency in ITA.31 
 
On the one hand, some scholars argue that ITA is still arbitration, and it should be treated 
as such.32 Arbitration belongs to the parties.33 Transparency is likely to add unwanted 
costs and delays.34 ITA should not be modelled after a judicial system – it should be left 
to evolve according to the needs of its users.35 Without confidentiality, arbitration might 
lose its appeal as an alternate form of dispute resolution.36 
 
Furthermore, confidentiality is an important aspect of arbitration. It allows business and 
government secrets to be safeguarded.37 It de-politicises the dispute, and might reduce the 
tensions between the parties, making settlement easier.38  
 
On the other hand, it is argued that ITA needs to be more transparent in order to achieve 
greater representation of the public interest, public acceptance of ITA, and to aid the 
development of a coherent body of ITA jurisprudence. 
1 Representation of the Public Interest  
The most-cited reason for transparency in ITA is that ITA implicates the public interest in 
ways which are not present within international commercial arbitration.39 Past ITA claims 
have involved disputes arising from bans on export of hazardous wastes,40 the creation of 
  
 
31 Alessandra Asteriti and Christian J Tams “Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration” in in Stephan W Schill (ed) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 787 at 788. 
32  See for example Dussan Laverde, above n 6; Sabater, above n 6. 
33  Dussan Laverde, above n 6, at 107; Sabater, above n 6, at 50. 
34 Dussan Laverde, above n 6, at 122. 
35 Nana Japaridze “Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice with Preserving the 
Nature of International Commercial Arbitration” (2008) 36 Hofstra L Rev 1415 at 1444. 
36  Dussan Laverde, above n 6, at 113-114. 
37 At 114.  
38  At 114; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania (Procedural Order Number 3) 
ICSID ARB/05/22, 29 September 2006. at [136]. 
39
  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 9, at [1]; Fracassi, above n 9; 
“Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations” (2001) 2 Chi J Intl L 213; Tuck, above n 17, 
at 912. 
40  S.D. Myers, Inc v Government of Canada (Merits)
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an ecological park,41 Argentina’s management of an economic crisis,42 mining within 
Native American reserve land,43 and provision of water to major cities.44 All of these 
disputes implicated third-party rights, including human and cultural rights.45 
 
Transparency protects democratic values by ensuring that those who are affected by an 
ITA award are informed about that award.46 Transparency initiatives give the public an 
opportunity to participate in ITA and ensure that the adverse impact of any award on third 
parties is known by the tribunal. 
2 Legitimacy of ITA 
A second rationale for transparency in ITA is that it would diffuse criticism of ITA as 
secretive and un-democratic.47 Given the public interests involved in ITA, there is an 
expectation that the public be able to access information about ITA. This is particularly 
so given the near-universal principle of open justice in domestic courts.48 The perceived 
secrecy of arbitral tribunals has prompted attacks on the democratic legitimacy of ITA.49 
Transparency is accepted as an important aspect of regaining public acceptance of ITA.50 
3 Development of ITA Jurisprudence 
Greater transparency of ITA awards would allow a more coherent ITA jurisprudence to 
develop. This would increase the predictability and consistency of ITA.51  
 
  
 
41  Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States (Merits) (2000) 40 ILM 36. 
42  See the discussion in Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill “Investor-State Arbitration as 
Govenance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative 
Law” (IILJ Working Paper 2009/6, Global Administrative Law Series, 19 August 2009) at 6. 
43  Glamis Gold Ltd v The United States of America (Award) Michael Young, David Caron, Kenneth 
Hubbard 14 May 2009 
44  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Liability) ICSID ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010 
45  See also the comments of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at UNCITRAL 
Working Group II Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its 
Fifty-Fourth Session A/CN.9/717 (2011) at [15]. 
46 Dussan Laverde, above n 6, at 126. 
47  Schill, above n 1, at 6. 
48  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 9, at [13]. 
49  See for example Anthony de Palma “NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle 
Disputes, But Go Too Far, Critics Say” (The New York Times, 11 March 2001). 
50  J Anthony Van Duzer “Enhancing Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration through 
Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation” (2007) 52 McGill LJ 681 at 686. 
51  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 9, at [42]. 
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Most importantly, greater transparency would allow equal access for all parties to past 
ITA awards. Top international firms build up private libraries of past awards which they 
then draw upon when faced with similar issues in future disputes. Some parties, 
particularly developing States, cannot afford representation by such firms.52 This means 
they have limited access to prior ITA decisions. Making those decisions publicly 
available would go some way to addressing that inequality.  
D Movements towards Transparency 
In response to this debate, there has been a marked move towards transparency in ITA. 
 
Increasingly, investment treaties themselves include more detailed provisions on 
transparency in ITA.53 Notably, section 2102 (b) (3) of the United States Trade Act of 
2002 provides that, in negotiating treaties, the administration must: “ensur[e] the fullest 
measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism […]”.54 
 
(a) NAFTA 
The development of transparency has been particularly notable within Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA.55  
 
There are minimal transparency provisions within NAFTA Chapter 11. Article 1126 (13) 
requires that a public register of arbitration claims be maintained. In awards against 
Canada or the United States, but not against Mexico, either party may make the award 
public.56 Other than that, all procedural measures are determined by reference to the 
applicable arbitral rules. 
 
NAFTA tribunals have readily found space for transparency measures within those 
procedural rules. In the first Chapter 11 case brought against the United States, in 2001, 
  
 
52  Tienhaara, above n 1, at 612. 
53 Euler, above n 10, at 143; James Harrison “Recent Developments to Promote Transparency and 
Public Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration” University of Edinburgh Working Paper 
Series No 2011/01 at 8; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 9, at 
[18]. 
54  Trade Act of 2002 19 USC §2102. 
55  North American Free Trade Agreement, United States-Canada-Mexico 32 ILM 605 (signed 17 
December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA] 
56 Frederico Ortino “External Transparency of Investment Awards” (paper presented to Inaugural 
Conference of the Society of International Economic Law, Geneva, July 2008) at 697; NAFTA 
annex 1137.4. 
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the tribunal considered the United States government’s obligations under the Freedom of 
Information Act.57 The tribunal concluded that there was no general obligation of 
confidentiality in NAFTA, and thus the relevant documents could be released.58 
 
This interpretation of NAFTA Chapter 11 was confirmed in an Interpretative Note from 
the Free Trade Commission.59 The Interpretative Note instructed each of the NAFTA 
Parties to make publicly available all documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter 11 
tribunal.60 Following this Note, the public has had substantial access to information and 
documents related to Chapter 11 cases.61  
 
Subsequently, a number of Chapter 11 tribunals allowed amici curiae submissions from 
non-disputing parties.62 In these cases, the tribunal considered that it was within the scope 
of art 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules (which allows the tribunal to conduct the arbitration 
in such manner as it considers appropriate)63 to receive submissions from third-parties.64 
 
The Fair Trade Commission then made a Statement in October 2003 confirming that no 
provision of NAFTA limits a tribunal’s discretion to receive submissions from a non-
disputing party, and sets out guidelines for procedures to be followed by prospective 
third-parties. 65 
 
A number of NAFTA arbitrations have also been held in public. The hearings in 
Methanex v United States, UPS v Canada, and in Canfor v United States of America were 
open to the public and broadcast live.66 
  
 
57  Freedom of Information Act 5 USC; Loewen Group Inc and Raymond Loewen v United States of 
America (Award) (2003) 42 ILM 811 [Loewen]. 
58 Loewen. 
59 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (31 July 
2001). 
60 Ibid. 
61  Van Duzer, above n 50, at 700. 
62 Methanex Corporation v United States (Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits) (2005) 44 ILM 
1345; United Parcel Service of America Inc v Canada (Award) (2007) IIC 306. 
63 United Nations Commission on International Trade 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules GA Res 
31/98 (1976) [1976 UNCITRAL Rules]. 
64 United Parcel Services of America v Canada, above n 62, at [70]. 
65 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party 
participation (7 October 2003). 
 
66 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 9, at [29], [34], [35]. 
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(b) ICSID 
ICSID reformed its Rules in 2006 to ensure that ICSID arbitrations were more 
transparent.67 The new Rules now allow the tribunal to open hearings to the public.68 
Rule 37 allows the tribunal to accept written submissions from third parties, after 
consulting with both parties. Rule 48 mandates early publication of awards. The ICSID 
Secretariat registers all cases, including the name of the parties, the date of registration 
and a short description of the dispute.69 
E Transparency’s Discontents 
It is not universally accepted that ITA should be transparent.  
 
Some argue that the control an arbitration-as-contract framework gives the parties in ITA 
is one of its strengths. Nana Japaridze, for example, argues that it is important that 
arbitration remain distinct from national court systems, in order to retain its appeal as an 
alternative to courts.70 It is feared that the imposition of mandatory rules will negate the 
viability of arbitration as an alternative to courts, and push investors towards other, even 
less transparent options, such as mediation.71  
 
Furthermore, it might be questioned whether transparency will achieve its aims. 
Democratic accountability requires more than openness.72 The success or not of 
transparency in ITA will ultimately be measured by arbitral practice.73 Greater openness 
will only lead to greater representation of the public interest if the public do in fact take 
an interest in ITA, and ITA tribunals genuinely take the views of the public into account. 
As for the development of a coherent jurisprudence, publication of awards in the cases of 
CME v Czech Republic and Lauder v Czech Republic did not prevent the tribunals 
reaching opposite conclusions on the same facts.74 
  
67  See ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, as amended 2006 [ICSID Arbitration 
Rules]. 
68 Rule 32. 
69 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 9, at [5]. 
70 Japaridze, above n 35, at 1423. 
71 Dussan Laverde, above n 6, at 107; Munir Maniuzzaman “A Rethink of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement” 30 May 2013 Kluwer Arbitration Blog <www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com>. 
72  Thomas N Hale and Anne-Marie Slaughter “Transparency: Possibilities and Limitations” (2006) 30 
Fletcher F World Aff 153 at 153; Thomas N Hale “Transparency, Accountability, and Global 
Governance” (2008) 14 Global Governance 73. 
73  Tuck, above n 17, at 901. 
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Ultimately, transparency is one step towards establishing democratic legitimacy in ITA. It 
should not be considered a panacea.  
 
II Theorising Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
The increasing recognition of the importance of transparency in ITA is a significant step 
away from contract-based conceptions of arbitration where the parties are totally in 
control of arbitral procedure. The imposition of mandatory transparency measures is 
contrary to a consent-based theory of arbitration. This section will explore a number of 
alternate theories of arbitration which have been put forward, and examine whether those 
theories might explain the development of mandatory transparency standards. It will 
begin by setting out the contract-based theory of arbitration, before discussing ITA as a 
form of public law regulatory review; ITA as global administrative law; and ITA as 
global administrative law. 
A Arbitration as a Creature of Contract 
The classical conception of arbitration is as a creature of contract. Party autonomy is of 
primary importance.75 The tribunal has authority because the parties have agreed to be 
bound by an award made by the tribunal.76 The parties are free to agree upon the arbitral 
procedure, and rules of procedure have force because of the parties’ agreement to be 
bound by them.77 Accordingly, transparency could not be imposed unless the parties 
consented to it. 
 
In ITA, there is no contract between the parties. It is “arbitration without privity”.78 
Rather, consent to arbitration is found in the combination of the offer to arbitration made 
in the IIA signed between States and the investor’s acceptance of that offer. The 
“contract” which governs the arbitration is in fact a treaty between sovereign entities.  
 
Gus Van Harten argues that a private party’s consent to arbitration should not be 
conflated with a State’s agreement to arbitrate in a BIT. Commercial arbitration 
                                                                                                                                                 
74  CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic (Award) (2002) 9 ICSID Reports 121; Lauder v The 
Czech Republic (Award) (2002) 9 ICSID Reports 66. 
75 Gary B Born International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edition, Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2009) at 185. 
76 At 185; Sabater, above n 6, at 50; Van Harten, above n 19, at 59. 
77 Born, above n 75, at 1748. 
78  Jan Paulsson “Arbitration Without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Review 232. 
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agreements are entered into by private parties acting as such, or by a State acting in a 
private rather than sovereign capacity.79 States concluding BITs do so in their sovereign 
capacity. Furthermore, State consent to ITA is anomalous to contractual consent to 
arbitration: it is will apply to all disputes arising under the IIA, rather than a specific 
dispute or disputes arising from a specific relationship.80 
 
A contractual conception of ITA fails to consider the fact that no contract exists between 
the parties as such, and accordingly there has been little opportunity to negotiate the 
specifics of procedure.  
B ITA as Public Law Adjudication 
Gus Van Harten proposes that ITA is closer to regulatory review than it is to contract-
based commercial arbitration. Accordingly, he argues that principles of public law 
adjudication – such as openness – should be incorporated into ITA.81 
 
First, Van Harten notes that the jurisdiction of an ITA tribunal originates in a treaty: an 
instrument of public, rather than private, law.82 
 
Second, like public law forms of dispute resolution, ITA has a one-sided dynamic: States 
are always liable, and only investors can bring a claim.83 
 
The nature of the relationship between the parties to an ITA dispute is distinct from that 
existing in commercial arbitration. The State and the investor are not juridical equals; 
rather, ITA engages the regulatory relationship existing between State and subject.84 ITA 
disputes almost always occur when the regulatory actions of the host State impact 
negatively on the operation of a foreign investor. The investor then seeks to prevent that 
exercise of regulatory power, by bringing a claim that the State has breached its 
obligations under a relevant IIA. ITA imposes restraints on the State’s exercise of its 
regulatory power vis-à-vis investors, according to the obligations found in the IIA.85 
  
 
79 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin “Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law” (2006) 17 EJIL 121 at 142. 
80 Van Harten, above n 19. 
81  Ibid. 
82  At 128 
83  At 124. 
84  At 45, 48. 
 
85  At 65; Schill, above n 1, at 17. 
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Van Harten questions whether it is appropriate for a private dispute resolution system to 
address these disputes. Privately appointed arbitrators review the sovereign acts of States. 
There is no requirement to show deference towards the decisions of the democratically 
elected legislature, as is usually required by domestic courts acting within a constitutional 
framework.86 The State cannot argue that it has acted within the law: ITA engages the 
international principle of state responsibility.87 Arbitrators can award damages against the 
State without regard to the usual limitations on public law damages.88 The award is then 
enforceable internationally through the ICSID Convention or the New York 
Convention.89 
 
Van Harten argues that, in recognition of the regulatory nature of investment disputes, 
ITA should draw on principles of public law adjudication. Thus, procedural principles 
broadly recognised in public law review – such as transparency – would be incorporated 
into ITA.90 Tribunals would be expected to be aware of the broader regulatory concerns 
implicated in ITA.91 It might also make room for tribunals to show some deference to 
States in difficult cases.92 
 
One problem with conceptualising ITA as an extension of the administrative law system 
of States is that ITA was designed to avoid domestic court procedures.93 Arguing that 
ITA tribunals should look more like domestic courts ignores the desire of States to avoid 
the court system in entering into arbitration clauses in their IIAs. 
  
  
86  Van Harten, above n 19, at 4, 106. 
87  At 67. 
88  At 4, 102-105 
89 At 5; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States 575 UNTS 159 (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966), art 
48(5) [ICSID Convention]; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Convention) 330 UNTA 38 (signed 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 
1959). 
90  See Van Harten Chapter 7; Giacinto della Cananea “Minimum Standards of Procedural Justice in 
Administrative Adjudication” in Stephan W Schill (ed) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 39; Chester Brown “Procedure in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Relevance of Comparative Public Law” in Stephan W Schill 
(ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010) 659; Asteriti and Tams, above n 31. 
91  Van Harten, above n 19, at 144. 
92  Ibid. 
 
93  Jan Paulsson “International Arbitration is Not Arbitration” (2009) 6 TDM 1. 
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The purpose of creating arbitration as an alternative to domestic courts was to provide a 
neutral and independent forum for the resolution of disputes with States.94 This aim is not 
incompatible with addressing the concerns raised by authors such as Van Harten who 
believe that ITA as private arbitration strays too far from general principles of regulatory 
review. Thus, the fact that ITA was envisaged as an alternative to courts does not prevent 
the incorporation of regulatory review principles into ITA.  
 
Thinking of the parallels between ITA and regulatory review helps make clear some of 
the concerns that arise from applying a private model of dispute resolution to investment 
disputes. One of these concerns is the lack of transparency in ITA. It is possible, 
therefore, that international efforts to make ITA more transparent are guided by the 
recognition that ITA is a form of regulatory review. 
C ITA as a form of Global Administrative Law 
Some legal scholars have looked beyond national regulatory review structures to the 
growing framework of international regulation. This global regulation has given rise to a 
study of “global administrative law” (GAL): the study of the systems and structures in 
place to ensure the accountability of global regulatory bodies.95 
 
Gus Van Harten and Marin Loughlin argue that ITA is “the clearest form of global 
administrative law”.96 This paper will now explore the concept of GAL, and ITA’s place 
within GAL. 
1 A Global System of Administration 
Underlying GAL is an increase in reach and forms of international regulation.97 Global 
regulators are coming together in international institutions to set standards that are then 
  
94
  At 2-3 
95  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B Stewart and Jonathan B Wiener “Foreword: Global 
Governance as Administration – National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative 
Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs 1; Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart 
“The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs 15. 
96 Van Harten and Loughlin, above n 79.  
97  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B Stewart and Jonathan B Wiener “Foreword: Global 
Governance as Administration – National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative 
Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs 1 at 16. 
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implemented within domestic law.98 These standards are often addressed to individuals or 
private entities, rather than to States.99  
 
International regulation now comes in many forms, such as treaty organisations like the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO); international institutions like the World Bank; 
informal international regulatory networks such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision; and networks of national bodies such as the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO). All of these bodies are exercising functions that, if they existed on 
a domestic level, would be recognised as administrative.100  
 
GAL thus operates between a range of international entities: States, non-governmental 
organisations, inter-state agencies and multinational corporations.101 Not all of these 
entities derive their legitimacy through the consent of States expressed in international 
instruments. This is one source of concern about the legitimacy of global regulation. 
Another is that global regulation does not operate like traditional international law. 
Traditional international legal instruments leave States free to choose how to implement 
the standards set out therein into domestic law. When specific regulation is developed at 
an international level, to be incorporated wholesale into domestic law, States have no 
room to opt out of the application of that standard if it does not enjoy domestic 
democratic support.102 
 
This has led to criticism of these regulatory bodies based on their lack of legitimacy and 
accountability.103 GAL aims to address these concerns. It identifies the emergence of 
administrative law-type mechanisms to combat the democratic deficit in these 
organisations,104 and to avoid these often powerful organisations becoming a “runaway 
and shadowy technocracy”.105  
  
98  Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury “Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order” (2006) 17 EJIL 1at 11. 
99  At 11. 
100  At 3. 
101  Andrew D Mitchell and John Farnik “Global Administrative Law: Can It Bring Global Governance 
to Account?” (2009) 37 Fed L Rev 237 at 237. 
102  Krisch and Kingsbury, above n 98, at 3. 
103  Benedict Kingsbury “The Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance” (2005) 99 ASIL 
PROC 143 at 153. 
104  At 245. 
105  At 244. 
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2 Transparency in GAL 
Transparency is often identified as an important principle of GAL.106 Transparency is 
seen as an important check on the exercise of arbitrary power.107 It allows the effective 
exercise of participation rights and rights of review, and encourages accountability by 
allowing scrutiny of the decision-making process.108 
 
Thus, the push for transparency in ITA might be sourced from recognition that ITA is a 
form of GAL. 
3 ITA as a form of GAL 
The challenges facing ITA are similar to those facing the global regulatory sphere which 
GAL seeks to address.109 
 
ITA can be seen as a form of GAL because it reviews the regulatory actions of States for 
consistency with obligations owed under investment treaties.110 ITA awards increasingly 
place procedural as well as substantive limitations on domestic regulation, such that ITA 
awards define for many States proper standards of good governance.111 To the extent that 
it places limits on domestic regulation, it fits into the global system of administration 
identified by GAL.  
 
Conceptualising ITA as GAL, rather than simply domestic regulatory review, takes into 
account the international element of the dispute. This might provide guidance as to the 
sort of measures which should be put in place to address the legitimacy challenges to 
ITA. If the international community were thinking of ITA as GAL, we could expect that 
the discussion around what reforms to make – and why – would have parallels with GAL 
literature.  
  
 
106  Susan Marks “Naming Global Administrative Law” (2005) 37 NYUJ Intl L & Pol 995 at 998; 
Kingsbury, above n 103, at 143; Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, above n 95, at 38. 
107  Marks, above n 106, at 998. 
108  Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, above n 95, at 38. 
109  Kingsbury and Schill, above n 42, at 40. 
110  At 1. 
111  Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, above n 95, at 2, 36. 
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4 GAL as Law 
The core principles recognised as emerging within GAL include fair and legal decision-
making; access to review mechanisms; proportionality and reasonableness; legitimate 
expectations; and procedural participation and transparency.112 
 
It is necessary to locate a source of authority for these emerging principles. GAL draws 
on relevant treaties and rules of customary international law, the decisions of 
intergovernmental organisations, and the practices of domestic and international 
regulatory forums.113 It is possible that these principles might gain authority as general 
principles of international law if adopted by a sufficient number of institutions. 
 
A detailed and coherent approach of GAL as law has yet to appear. No definitive body of 
GAL rules and principles has been formulated and agreed upon.114 While scholars such as 
Dyzenhaus and Kingsbury have made good inroads into conceptualising GAL as a 
system of law,115 no agreed-upon theory of GAL has yet emerged. 
 
GAL is very much an emerging field of study, and this lack of coherence might be 
expected as a result. However, this poses serious challenges for the use of GAL as a 
framework for reform in ITA. It is likely to prevent GAL from gaining orthodoxy as a 
source of principles among international law-makers.  
D ITA as a species of public international law adjudication 
Rather than relying on the nascent study of GAL to explain the nature of ITA, it is 
possible to locate ITA within more familiar fields of international law. 
 
The source of legal authority of both the agreement to arbitrate and the obligations owed 
to investors by States is a treaty – an instrument of public international law. Thus, ITA 
can be located within international law. This presents two challenges: first, how can 
investors, as non-State actors, fit within an international law paradigm? Second, what 
insight does conceptualising ITA within international law provide, and does it give rise to 
a source of authority for transparency obligations? 
  
 
112  Kingsbury, above n 103, at 145. 
113  Kingsbury, above n 103, at 146; Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, above n 95, at 29. 
114  Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, above n 95, at 31. 
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1 Investors as Actors in Public International Law 
Although the source of legal authority for ITA is an investment treaty signed by States, 
the arbitration itself occurs between a State and a private investor.  
 
There has long been debate over whether investors can be considered actors in 
international law.116 It is possible that private investors gain some limited form of 
international personality when States, through mutual consent, grant it to them.117  
 
Even if investors are not recognised as international legal persons, States may confer 
rights on private parties through international legal instruments,118 including the ability to 
enforce those rights.119 This is found in international human rights regimes such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which not only confers rights upon individuals 
as against States but also gives those individuals a procedural mechanism through which 
those rights can be enforced directly against States.120 This is in many ways analogous to 
the position of investors under BITs. 
 
Accordingly, the fact that ITA occurs between a State and a non-State is not a barrier to it 
being a form of international law adjudication. 
2 Implications 
Thinking of ITA as a form of international arbitration changes the basis of arbitral 
authority. Arbitral authority is no longer rooted in the consent of the parties to the 
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the Legal Personality of Corporations and NGOs in the Context of Investor-State Arbitration” in 
Jean d’Aspremont Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-
State Actors in International Law (Routledge, Oxon, 2011) 360 at 362; Douglas, above n 7, at 182. 
117  W C Jenks “Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations” in O J Lissitzyn, L Henkin and W G 
Friedmann (eds) Transnational Law in a Changing Society: Essays in Honor of Philip C Jessup 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1972) at 74: “The law of nations permits the creation of any 
new legal entity which the needs of international society require, provided the will to create it is 
clearly expressed and what is created is tangible and workable”; Dumberry and Labelle-Eastaugh, 
above n 116, at 363. 
118
  Douglas, above n 7, at 182; Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Advisory Opinion) [1928] PCIJ 
(series B) No 15 at 17-19; H Lauterpacht Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of 
Codification of the International Law Commission A/CN.4/I/Rev 1 (1949) at 19-20. 
119   Dumberry and Labelle-Eastaugh, above n 116, at 364. 
120  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 222 (opened 
for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR]; see also the 
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dispute. Rather, the consent of the State Parties to the IIA becomes paramount, and ITA 
is bounded by rules of international law. Those rules might provide a source of authority 
for transparency obligations.  
3 Transparency as a Principle of International Economic Law 
Transparency has been characterised as a fundamental principle of international 
economic law.121 It is recognised as a general principle of NAFTA, and transparency 
provisions are included in many international economic agreements.122 Some tribunals 
have also considered transparency to be an element of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard found in almost all IIAs.123 
 
Transparency as a principle of international economic law is addressed to the State as 
regulator of the investment environment. It requires that States make readily available 
laws and regulations which might affect foreign investors.124 The purpose of this 
transparency is to enable foreign investors to make business and legal decisions with full 
knowledge of the relevant facts.125 
 
It is questionable whether this principle of regulatory transparency can be applied 
wholesale to ITA, so as to found a principle of adjudicatory transparency. The purpose of 
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regulatory transparency in international economic law – to ensure a predictable 
investment environment – is distinct from the purposes of transparency in ITA, as 
discussed above. 
 
It might be argued that, to the extent an ITA award can impact a State’s regulatory policy, 
ITA should be caught by this principle of regulatory transparency. However, the content 
of transparency measures would then be determined by the purpose of ensuring a 
predictable investment environment. This is not the case: transparency in ITA is primarily 
for the benefit of the general public. Thus an analysis of transparency in ITA as an aspect 
of regulatory transparency does not fit with the way transparency reforms are being 
talked about.  
4 Transparency as a Principle of International Adjudication 
It is possible to conceptualise ITA tribunals as bodies of international law adjudication, 
bound by the procedural principles which govern such institutions.126 ITA tribunals 
would thus be seen as more similar to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) than to commercial arbitration tribunals. 
Reform of ITA would be driven by a desire to put in place the appropriate procedural 
mechanisms to reflect the nature of ITA tribunals as international adjudicatory bodies. 
That leads to the question of whether it is possible to identify a general procedural law of 
international adjudication.127 
 
Various sources of international procedure can be identified. Of course, there are the 
constituent instruments of the international courts. Procedural rules may also be derived 
from customary international law, international judicial and arbitral practice, and general 
principles of law.128 Chester Brown argues that a “common law of international 
adjudication” is emerging, as international courts draw on each other’s procedural 
practice when exercising their own inherent powers.129 
 
The ICJ has identified “principles of procedural law”.130 It is possible that transparency is 
one such principle. ICJ hearings are by default public.131 The judge may decide to hold a 
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closed hearing, or the hearing may be closed on the request of both the parties.132 
However, it is unusual for the Court to hold closed hearings.133 
 
Hearings are also public before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS),134 the European Court of Justice,135 and the ECtHR.136 
 
There are, however, a number of international adjudicatory bodies which operate under 
default rules of confidentiality. This includes WTO dispute settlement and the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA).137 However, recent pushes for more transparency in WTO 
dispute settlement procedures have led to greater access for NGOs and the public;138 and 
the PCA has held public hearings where there is significant public interest in the 
dispute.139 
 
It seems, then, that the importance of public hearings is widely recognised by 
international law adjudicatory bodies. It seems unlikely that this has the force of law 
sufficient to mandate that ITA tribunals establish transparent procedures, if they were 
recognised as international adjudicatory bodies. The content of transparency rules differs 
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from body to body, such that it cannot be said that a general principle of transparency 
exists among international courts and tribunals.140 
 
However, characterising ITA as a form of international adjudication situates it next to 
these bodies, rather than private commercial arbitration tribunals. The dispute resolution 
process is seen to have different stakeholders: it is not only the parties to the dispute who 
are recognised as having an interest in the outcome. As a result, a different framework for 
procedure emerges. The will of the parties is no longer paramount. This makes space for 
the imposition of transparency requirements to serve the interests of third parties who 
might be affected by the dispute. 
 
Having set out a number of possible conceptions of ITA, this paper will now introduce 
the recently finalised UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency. It will analyse the 
transparency rules, and the discussions around their development, to examine whether 
any of the above conceptions of ITA help explain the push for transparency within the 
UNCITRAL Rules. 
 
III The New UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were not specifically designed to resolve investor-
State disputes; rather, they are intended to provide procedural guidance in any 
arbitration.141 They are designed to be acceptable in countries with different legal, social 
and economic systems.142  
 
In 2010, a revised version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules was finalised in order to 
address the changes in arbitral practice that had taken place in the thirty years prior.143 
 
When preparing the revised version of the Rules, the issue of transparency in investor-
State arbitration became contentious when Canada submitted that the reform should 
include enhanced transparency measures for ITA.144 It was joined by two NGOs, the 
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Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD).145 Canada, CIEL and IISD argued that ITA could be 
distinguished from commercial arbitration by reason of its public interest implications, 
and that enhanced transparency for ITA disputes under the UNCITRAL Rules could be 
easily achieved. 
 
Working Group II (WGII) decided that the question of transparency in ITA should be 
considered, but after completion of the revision of the Rules.146 Discussion of 
transparency in ITA began in June 2010 with the circulation of a questionnaire to States 
regarding their practice on transparency in ITA.147 
 
The decision to reform the UNCITRAL Rules is significant because it closes a loophole 
that investors might have been exploiting to avoid transparent arbitration. The offer to 
arbitrate found in most IIAs gives investors the option to choose between arbitration 
under the ICSID Rules, UNCITRAL Rules and possibly some other option. When the 
ICSID Rules were reformed in 2006, investors may have elected for arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL Rules in order to avoid the transparency requirements of ICSID. Although 
there is little evidence of this,148 it is possible that investment disputes taken under the 
UNCITRAL Rules by reason of their enhanced confidentiality would not have reached 
the public sphere at all, thus skewing known statistics.149 Given that an estimated 25% of 
all known ITA is conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules, the UNCITRAL reforms will 
have a significant effect on arbitration practice.  
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WGII believed that ensuring greater transparency in ITA was an important response to 
the increasing challenges to the legitimacy of international investment law and ITA. 
Increased transparency would enhance the public understanding of the process and its 
overall credibility.150 Transparency and inclusiveness were expressions of core United 
Nations values such as human rights, good governance and the rule of law.151 
Transparency in ITA was understood as only one aspect of the broader notion of 
transparency in international investment law.152  
 
It was generally agreed that ITA could be distinguished from purely private arbitration, 
where confidentiality was recognised as an essential feature.153 ITA tribunals might 
scrutinise the legislative, administrative or judicial activities of a State, with very limited 
possibility of appeal.154 ITA might involve consideration of public policy and could lead 
to large potential monetary liability for governments.155  The Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General made a statement that transparency in ITA was essential where 
human rights, including access to clean water, affirmative action policies and the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights, were concerned, in order to ensure that societies 
were aware of proceedings that might affect the public interest and therefore their own 
welfare.156 
 
The reasons given by WGII for transparency reforms in ITA give clues as to how WGII 
was thinking about ITA. WGII distinguished ITA from commercial arbitration on the 
grounds that it implicated core public interests and engaged the tribunal in regulatory 
review of the State’s actions. This mirrors the discussion in Part I above, and matches the 
arguments of theorists who highlight the regulatory nature of ITA disputes. This indicates 
that one motivation for transparency reforms in UNCITRAL might be the recognition 
that ITA is closer to regulatory review than it is to contract-based arbitration. 
 
WGII was, however, keen to protect the consensual nature of arbitration. Delegations 
were wary of transparency being made a mandatory rule.157 Yet it was noted that consent 
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to ITA is expressed in a different way than consent to commercial arbitration. It exists on 
two levels: one between States, and the other between the host State and the investor.158 
The nature of consent to ITA formed an important part of discussions about the way in 
which the transparency standard would apply. 
 
WGII’s transparency reforms were motivated by a desire to recognise the interests of 
non-parties to the dispute. The reforms were not aimed to benefit the parties to the 
arbitration, but rather to ensure that ITA serves the broader public interest. This is a 
further step away from a contractual conception of ITA, under which the only interests to 
be considered are those of the parties. 
 
The substantive issues to be considered when discussing transparency reforms were 
publication of arbitration documents, publication of arbitral awards, submissions by third 
parties, public hearings, possible exceptions, and establishing a repository for the 
published information.159 
A Application of the New Transparency Standard 
It was clear that WGII considered it necessary to gain the consent of the State parties to 
the relevant treaty before any transparency standard would apply in ITA. There was 
significant debate about how that consent might be expressed. 
 
Debate centred around whether consent to the application of the standard for treaties 
concluded after the rules on transparency came into force (future treaties) would be opt-in 
or opt-out; and whether and how the rules on transparency would apply to investment 
treaties which had been concluded prior to the standard entering into force (existing 
treaties). 
1 Opt-out versus opt-in 
The key issue for the application of the transparency standard to future treaties was the 
manner in which consent to be bound by the standard would be expressed.160 Consent to 
the transparency standard might be presumed by reference to the UNCITRAL Rules in 
the absence of any express indication to the contrary (the opt-out option); or consent 
might require an express reference to the transparency standard (the opt-in option). 
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(a) Opt-out 
Some delegations felt that a presumption that the transparency standard apply would 
better fulfil the mandate given to WGII to enhance and promote transparency in ITA.161 
The opt-out option was said to be similar to art 1(2) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules,162 
which provides that “the parties to an arbitration agreement concluded after 15 August 
2010 shall be presumed to have referred to the Rules in effect on the date of 
commencement of the arbitration, unless the parties have agreed to apply a particular 
version of the Rules […]”.163 
 
(b) Opt-in 
The opt-in mechanism would require the IIA to contain an express reference to the 
transparency standard. This would avoid any legal uncertainty as to whether the 
transparency standard applied to a particular arbitration.164 Furthermore, it was argued 
that the opt-in mechanism best complied with public international law and practice, 
insofar as it ensured that States were not subject to any obligations to which they had not 
consented.165 
 
(c) Compromise 
It was agreed that an opt-out standard would apply for future treaties, while an opt-in 
standard would apply to existing treaties.166  
 
This means that for future treaties, the transparency standard would apply if the treaty 
referred to the UNCITRAL Rules, unless the State Parties agreed otherwise. For existing 
treaties, the transparency standard would only apply when the State Parties had expressly 
consented to it.167 
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It seems that future treaties must refer to the 2014 version of the UNCITRAL Rules, or 
not specify the applicable version, in order for the transparency standard to apply. 
Although the transparency standard specifies that it will apply to all arbitration “initiated 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to a treaty providing for the protection 
of investments or investors”,168 thus indicating that the standard would apply no matter 
the version of the UNCITRAL Rules being used, only the 2014 version of the Rules will 
contain a link to the transparency standard. Furthermore, it was suggested during 
deliberations that a reference to the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules would be sufficient to 
indicate that the State parties to the treaties did not intend the transparency standard to 
apply.169 
2 Application to Existing Treaties 
By 2010, 2,500 investment treaties were already in force.170 The question of whether the 
transparency standard would apply to existing treaties would therefore determine whether 
it applied to the majority of ITA. Many delegations wanted the transparency standard to 
apply to these existing treaties, in order to enhance transparency in ITA.171 
 
WGII recognised that the UNCITRAL Rules should be interpreted in light of public 
international law, as they are included in a treaty. Any application of the transparency 
standard is therefore not possible without the consent of the State Parties to the treaty.172 
Application of the transparency standard to treaties entered into force prior to the 
completion of the transparency standard could give rise to a legal challenge on the ground 
of retroactivity.173 
 
One possible way to get around that was through interpreting a reference to the 
UNCITRAL Rules as a “dynamic reference” to a system that develops over time.174 Thus, 
applying the transparency standard to ITA under existing treaties would not require 
retroactive application of the standard, but would rather be fulfilling the intention of the 
parties that the UNCITRAL Rules as they existed at the time of the arbitration should 
apply.175 The key question was determining the intention of the parties in referring to the 
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UNCITRAL Rules. If the treaty provides for the application of updated versions of the 
UNCITRAL Rules, evolution of those rules had been contemplated at the time of 
negotiation.176 
 
In response, it was argued that it was impossible to tell from a reference to the 
UNCITRAL Rules whether that included consent to any changes to those rules.177 The 
treaty may have been concluded at a time when transparency standards were not 
contemplated. 178 States should not be put in a position where they would have to reopen 
negotiations or issue declarations on interpretation on each of their existing treaties to 
indicate whether or not the rules on transparency would apply.179 
 
Ultimately, it was agreed that the transparency standard should not apply to existing 
treaties unless the parties to that treaty had expressly consented to its application.180 
Under this final compromise, the tribunal would have no discretion to determine that an 
IIA included a “dynamic reference” to an evolving system of UNCITRAL Rules.181 The 
compromise between delegations to WGII ensured that a high standard of transparency 
would be required by the transparency rules, but it would only apply where the State 
parties to the treaty had so elected.182  
 
Work has commenced on the drafting of a convention which will allow States to express 
consent to the transparency rules, so that they might apply in ITA under existing 
treaties.183 The convention will make the transparency standard applicable to ITA under 
IIAs between States which are parties to that convention. 
3 Analysis 
While the adoption of the opt-out approach for future treaties means that States must 
make clear an intention that the transparency rules not apply, this could be done quite 
simply by referring to the 2010 version of the Rules rather than the 2014 version. 
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Furthermore, the vast body of ITA happens under existing treaties. The transparency 
standard will not apply to these arbitrations unless all State Parties to the treaty have 
signed the convention which is currently being drafted, or have otherwise indicated 
consent to the application of the standard. 
 
The result of these two factors is that the practical effect of the transparency standard 
might be limited. Given the broad agreement of the State delegations to WGII that 
transparency in ITA is important, it might be hoped that these States will then incorporate 
the transparency standard in their future IIA drafting practice, and sign up to the 
convention. However, if this is not the case, the transparency standard may ultimately 
apply to only a fraction of ITA conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules. While the 
drafting of such a standard is in itself an important step in mainstreaming transparency in 
ITA, the measure of its success will be whether it has a substantial impact on the conduct 
of ITA tribunals. 
 
WGII’s discussion about how the transparency standard would apply to future treaties 
and existing treaties indicates how WGII was thinking about the nature of ITA. It is not 
the consent of the disputing parties which was considered paramount, but the consent of 
the State parties to the BIT. 
 
The importance of State consent to the transparency standard is born out of the fact that 
the relevant reference to the transparency standard is contained within an IIA. This means 
that its application is governed by international principles of treaty interpretation, 
including the primacy of State consent and the rule against retroactive application. WGII 
clearly locates ITA within an international law framework. The source of authority of 
ITA tribunals is not an agreement between the disputing parties, but the agreement 
between States to provide ITA as a dispute resolution mechanism in their investment 
treaties. 
B Conflict between the Transparency Standard and Other Provisions 
It is possible that the provisions of the transparency standard will conflict with other rules 
governing the arbitration. These rules might be found in the relevant treaty, the applicable 
arbitration rules, or in national law governing either of the parties to the dispute. WGII 
discussed which rule would be given priority in case of conflict. 
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It was agreed that the rules should not supersede a provision in the relevant treaty that 
required greater levels of transparency.184 In February 2012, questions were raised as to 
how to determine whether the treaty provision of the transparency standard required a 
greater level of transparency.185 WGII decided that the treaty provision should always 
prevail if there was a conflict between it and the transparency standard.186 This is 
reflected in art 1(7) of the transparency standard. 
 
It was agreed that, in case of a conflict between the transparency standard and the 
applicable arbitration rules, the transparency standard should prevail.187 
 
(a) Conflict with national law 
 
One issue was how national legal requirements to keep certain information confidential 
would fit with the rules on transparency.188 Most States are subject to legislation 
preventing the disclosure of certain kinds of information, particularly information relating 
to national security189 or information held by the government relating to individuals.190 
 
Possible conflict between national law and the transparency rules is addressed by art 
7(2)(c), which provides that, for information of the respondent State, any information that 
is protected against being made available to the public according to the law of the State is 
considered confidential. For all other information, any information which is protected 
against being made available to the public under any law or rules which the tribunal 
determines to be applicable to the disclosure of such information will be protected 
information. 
 
This exception ensures that compliance with the transparency standard will not put States 
or investors in breach of their national legal obligations. However, it also opens up the 
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possibility of States legislating to avoid the transparency standard, or using existing 
legislation to trigger this exception. This might be particularly problematic where 
legislation exists to protect the “commercially sensitive” information held by State 
organs. 
 
The decision that the law of the respondent State should apply to all information provided 
by that State, such that the State would not be under any obligation to release information 
that was protected by its own law, was controversial. Some delegations believed that it 
was necessary in order to reassure States that they would be able to protect national 
security information.191 Other delegations were concerned that the provision would be 
open for abuse, by allowing States to circumvent the transparency standard by legislating 
against the disclosure of information.192 
C Departing from the Transparency Standard  
Where the parties have elected to arbitrate under the UNCITRAL Rules, the parties are 
able to agree to modify the application of those Rules.193 One issue discussed by WGII 
was whether the parties to ITA should be similarly free to modify the application of the 
transparency standard. It was decided that they should not have the ability to alter how 
the provisions of the transparency standard apply to their dispute. 
 
Article 1(3)(a) of the transparency standard provides that “the disputing parties may not 
derogate from these Rules, by agreement or otherwise, unless permitted to do so by the 
treaty”. WGII considered that it would be inappropriate to allow the parties to depart 
from the transparency standard for two reasons. First, some delegations expressed the 
view that, because the arbitration was conducted on the basis of an underlying treaty 
between States, the ability of the disputing parties to depart from the prescribed route set 
out by that treaty was limited.194 It was not seen as appropriate to allow the disputing 
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parties to reverse a policy choice made by the State parties to the treaty.195 Accordingly, 
the parties should not be able to vary the transparency provisions mandated by the State 
parties to the treaty. 
 
The second reason against allowing the disputing parties to vary the application of the 
transparency standard was because the beneficiaries of the transparency provisions are 
the members of the general public, and not solely the investor and the host State.196 It 
would be inappropriate to allow the disputing parties to limit the rights transferred upon 
the general public by the transparency standard. 
1 By the Decision of the Tribunal 
A further issue was whether the tribunal might deviate from the transparency standard 
using its power in art 17(1) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.197 In the interests of ensuring 
efficient arbitral proceedings, some delegations proposed giving the tribunal the authority 
to vary practical matters such as time periods.198 Others suggested that the discretion of 
the tribunal to depart from the standard should not be limited.199 In response, it was said 
that an unlimited discretion to depart from the rules would erode the transparency 
standard.200 
 
It was agreed that some flexibility should be given to the tribunal, and so the tribunal 
should be given the discretion to adapt the rules in certain circumstances.201 The 
provision which ultimately became art 1(3)(b) was drafted accordingly. The provision 
was not intended to confer any significant power on the tribunal to diverge from the 
rules.202 
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2 Analysis 
Whereas a contract-based conception of arbitration would give the parties full freedom to 
modify the procedural rules applying to the arbitration, WGII decided it was not 
appropriate to allow the disputing parties to depart from the transparency standard unless 
the treaty at the heart of the dispute provides otherwise. This ensures that the 
transparency standard will not be watered down when it is applied in ITA.  
 
WGII’s comments that the transparency standard is for the benefit of the general public, 
and therefore the parties should not be able to alter its application indicate that WGII does 
not view ITA as being a matter simply between the parties. Rather, non-parties are 
recognised as having a genuine interest in ITA proceedings, giving rise to some rights 
under the transparency standard. 
 
The reasoning of WGII on this point emphasises the importance of the IIA at the heart of 
the dispute. The parties are unable to alter that agreement unless the treaty so allows. This 
shows that WGII views the international agreement as the key document in ITA, rather 
than the agreement between the parties. This indicates a shift in thinking away from a 
contract-based conception of arbitration and towards arbitration as a form of international 
law adjudication. 
 
IV Publication 
 
Publication of the awards of tribunals has occurred in practice for a long time, and is a 
core part of many transparency regimes. Following the 2001 Interpretative Note from the 
FTC, the public has substantial access to information and documents related to Chapter 
11 cases.203 The 2006 revision of the ICSID Rules makes early publication of awards 
mandatory.204 However, if both parties do not consent to publication of the award, ICSID 
only require the publication of excerpts of the legal conclusions of the tribunal.205 
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Publication was recognised as an important aspect of transparency by WGII.206 A registry 
would be established with responsibility for managing the publication of documents 
related to ITA.207  
A Publication at the Commencement of Arbitration 
Publication of the existence of the dispute at the initiation of arbitration is an important 
first step in ensuring that that dispute is conducted in a transparent manner.208 A debated 
issue in WGII discussions was what information should be made public at the initiation 
of arbitration proceedings, and when that information should be disclosed. 
 
There was debate over whether the notice of arbitration should be disclosed immediately 
upon receipt by the host State, or if it should only be disclosed once the tribunal had been 
constituted.209 Some delegations believed that it was important to inform civil society of 
the commencement of proceedings so as to allow civil society groups to express their 
views at an early stage, including possibly as to the composition of the tribunal.210 Others 
felt that civil society should have no role at this early stage of the proceedings, 
particularly in determining the membership of the arbitral tribunal.211 It was also said that 
publishing the parties’ positions at this point would preclude the possibility of settlement 
before the proceedings began.212 
 
Some delegations were concerned that the notice of arbitration would not provide 
balanced information on the case.213 Accordingly, the notice of arbitration should only be 
publicised once the respondent State had an opportunity to present its own position in 
response to the notice.214 There was support for the response to the notice of arbitration 
being published alongside the notice of arbitration.215 
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At the October 2011 meeting, it was generally understood that some information should 
be made public before the constitution of the tribunal, to allow the public to be informed 
of the commencement of the proceedings.216 The delegations agreed in February 2012 
that, upon receipt of the notice of arbitration, the repository would make available 
information regarding the name of the disputing parties, the economic sector involved, 
and the treaty under which the claim is being made.217 The notice of arbitration would 
then be released by the tribunal, after the tribunal had been constituted, through the 
mechanisms of art 3. 
B Documents to be Published 
A number of options for publication of documents were put forward. These included: 
making all documents publicly available;218 preparing a list of documents to be made 
public; 219 giving the tribunal the discretion to make some documents public, provided 
that the parties consented;220 and providing a list of documents that could be made 
publicly available, and to give the tribunal the discretion to decide which documents to 
publish in each case.221 
 
The first option received strong support at the October 2011 meeting.222 A draft list of 
documents to be published was put forward. This list included the notice of arbitration; 
the pleadings; submissions to the tribunal by a disputing party and any written 
submissions by any third-party; minutes or transcripts of the hearings of the tribunal; and 
orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal.223 
 
The question whether evidentiary material (such as witness statements, expert reports and 
exhibits) should be included provoked controversy.224 Some delegations felt that the 
exhibits might be too voluminous to publish.225 One proposal was that the parties prepare 
a list of exhibits, which would be made public, while the exhibits themselves would not 
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be made automatically available.226 Some delegations felt that it was inappropriate to 
require extra work of the parties in this way.227 It was agreed that, if such a list had 
already been prepared, it should be made publicly available.228 
 
At the October 2012 meeting, it was agreed that expert statements and witness reports 
should not be made be made available automatically, but that the tribunal would make 
them available to any party who requested them.229  
 
Any documents not otherwise covered by art 3 may be made public by the tribunal after 
consultation with the parties under art 3(3).230 
1 How does this compare to other ITA procedural rules? 
 
(a) NAFTA 
After the 2001 Interpretative Note on transparency, parties to NAFTA arbitration have 
been obliged to make available all documents submitted to, or issued by, a NAFTA 
tribunal.231 In practice, the tribunal will issue an order near the beginning of the 
arbitration, usually with the consent of the parties, regarding what information and 
documents relating to the proceedings may be publicly disclosed.232 This has tended to 
include the parties’ submissions, evidence, communications between the tribunal and the 
parties, submissions from non-disputing Parties, orders of the tribunal, transcripts of oral 
proceedings, and awards.233 Many of the documents are available online, and are 
accessible through the websites of the US State Department and the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 
 
Which documents are made public in NAFTA hearings is a matter of discretion for the 
tribunal, and in some arbitrations the disclosure of documents has been more limited.234 
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The UNCITRAL transparency standard, by specifying that certain documents must be 
made public, ensures a greater level of transparency than is available under NAFTA. 
 
(b) ICSID 
Nothing in the ICSID Rules directly addresses the publication of arbitration documents. 
The Secretary-General is obliged to publish some information about claims before 
ICSID, and this information is primarily available on ICSID’s website.235 Nothing in the 
Rules prevents the parties from publishing their submissions.236 
 
The disclosure of arbitration documents under the ICSID Rules relating to the arbitration 
was considered in detail by the tribunal in Biwater Gauff v Tanzania.237 The tribunal 
noted that, in the absence of a confidentiality agreement, there was nothing preventing the 
parties from disclosing documents related to the arbitration. However, it warned of the 
possible negative repercussions of drawing public and media attention to an on-going 
arbitration, particularly when that might politicise the dispute.238 The tribunal issued 
detailed recommendations for each of the different categories of documents.239 It 
recognised that decisions of the tribunal would be published through ICSID and that the 
parties were free to discuss the case in public, including through publication of their own 
documents. On the other hand, the tribunal felt that it would be inappropriate for records 
of the hearings, parties’ pleadings, correspondence between the tribunal and the parties, 
and documents provided by the other party to be disclosed without the agreement of both 
parties. 
 
The disclosure requirements of the UNCITRAL transparency standard are therefore much 
higher than the ICSID Rules. Under the transparency standard, there is no question of 
needing the agreement of the parties before documents may be published: the matters 
listed in art 3(1) must be made publicly available, subject only to the limited exceptions 
in art 7. 
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C Publication of Awards  
The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules required the consent of all parties before an award could be 
published.240 Among the delegations to WGII there was early and broad support for the 
reversal of this rule, so that publication of all ITA awards would be required.241 Even if 
no other documents were published, the publication of awards would be a decisive step 
towards enhancing the legitimacy of the process and towards establishing an accessible 
and consistent jurisprudence.242 
 
Some delegations argued that the parties should be able to agree to keep the award 
confidential. This proposal did not receive support. Under art 3 of the transparency rules, 
all decisions of the tribunal will be made public, subject only to the exceptions to 
transparency enumerated in art 7. 243 
 
This is a stronger publication rule than found in the ICSID Rules, which requires the 
consent of the parties before any award may be published.244 In the absence of the 
consent of the parties, ICSID will publish only excerpts of the legal reasoning of the 
tribunal.245 That being said, many ICSID awards are freely available online even in the 
absence of the consent of the parties.246 
 
Publication of all awards rendered in ITA under the UNCITRAL Rules will go a 
considerable way to achieving the aims of transparency in ITA. It will allow universal 
access to ITA awards, encouraging the development of a coherent, consistent investment 
jurisprudence. It allows public scrutiny of the reasoning of investment tribunals. Provided 
that legal reasoning is sound, this may lead to increased public confidence in ITA as a 
legitimate mechanism of dispute resolution. 
D Analysis 
Publication of documents does not further the interests of the parties to the dispute, and 
nor does it further the interest of the State parties to the treaty. Rather, its purpose is to 
increase public knowledge of ITA proceedings and to enable public participation. This 
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shows that WGII recognises that ITA may have implications for those who are not 
directly involved in the dispute, and that accordingly third parties should have some 
rights in ITA. WGII thus seems to be conceptualising ITA in a way that allows for third 
party rights in the proceedings. This fits with theories of ITA as regulatory review.  
 
V Third Party Participation 
 
Third party participation has been a controversial issue within transparency initiatives in 
ITA. The possibility of third-party submissions as amicus curiae is seen as a valuable 
mechanism for ensuring the representation of non-party interests which might be affected 
by the outcome of the arbitration.247 Allowing amicus curiae briefs ensures that affected 
parties have the opportunity to make the tribunal aware of the possible impacts of its 
decision.248 Amicus curiae may also bring a particular expertise to the proceedings.249 
 
When the applicable procedural rules are silent as to the participation of third parties, 
tribunals have allowed third party submissions in an exercise of their discretion. In the 
NAFTA case of Methanex v United States, a case governed by the UNCITRAL Rules, 
the tribunal allowed a number of groups to appear as amicus curiae in recognition of the 
public interest in the arbitration.250 The Free Trade COmmission then confirmed that 
amicus curiae could be admitted in NAFTA arbitration.251 
 
An ICSID tribunal also found that third party submissions could be accepted in Aguas 
Cordobesas SA Suez n Argentine Republic, a case commenced before the 2006 reform of 
the ICSID rules.252  
 
Third party participation was addressed in the 2006 revision of the ICSID Rules. Rule 37 
now allows ICSID tribunals to accept written submissions from non-disputing parties 
after consultation with the parties. The tribunal must be satisfied that the submission 
would be helpful in the determination of a factual or legal issue in the dispute; that the 
non-disputing party has a significant interest in the dispute; and that the amicus 
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submission would not disrupt the proceeding or unfairly burden either party.253 The 
adoption of rule 37(2) has not led to non-disputing parties becoming regular participants 
in ITA.254 There have been a small number of cases where non-disputing parties have 
filed amicus applications with tribunals based on rule 37(2).255 From these cases, the 
trend seems to be that tribunals will grant permission for non-disputing parties to make 
written submissions.256 
A In the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
There was strong support for allowing submissions by third parties as part of the 
transparency standard.257 It was said that third party submissions might be useful in 
resolving the dispute and in promoting the legitimacy of the arbitral process. 
 
Two options were presented at the October 2011 meeting. Option one would allow third 
party submissions without going into detail over questions of procedure.258 Option two 
more closely reflected the relevant provision in the ICSID Rules, and the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission’s Statement on non-disputing parties. It contained a detailed 
procedure on the information to be provided regarding the third party that wishes to make 
a submission; matters to be considered by the tribunal when determining whether or not 
to accept that submission; and the form of the submission itself.259 WGII proceeded on 
the basis of option two.260 Some delegations were concerned by the lack of guidance in 
option one, particularly given that some States might not be familiar with the concept of 
third party submissions.261 
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Article 4 of the transparency standard was drafted accordingly. Article 4 requires the 
tribunal to consult with the parties before accepting third party submissions.262 It also 
allows the tribunal to reject third party submissions on the basis that they would disrupt 
or unduly burden the proceedings, or unfairly prejudice a disputing party.263 It requires 
that the parties be given a reasonable opportunity to comment on any third party 
submissions.264 
1 Distinguishing between non-disputing State Parties and other third parties  
At the February 2011 meeting of WGII, a proposal was made to distinguish between 
submissions made by a non-disputing State Party to the investment treaty at issue in the 
dispute (non-disputing Parties) and submissions made by other third parties.265 This was 
based on two factors: first, that State might have important information on the travaux 
préparatoires of the treaty, which would help prevent one-sided treaty interpretation;266 
and second, there might be a need to limit the possible involvement of the investor’s 
home State in order to avoid straying into the territory of diplomatic protection.267 
 
It was agreed that non-disputing Parties should be able to comment on matters of treaty 
interpretation, and that the tribunal should be able to invite non-disputing Parties to make 
a submission on questions of treaty interpretation.268 If the tribunal did extend such an 
invitation, no inference would be drawn from the failure of any non-disputing Party to 
make a submission.269 If a non-disputing party made such a submission on their own 
initiative, the submission “shall” be accepted by the tribunal.270 
 
This language was the subject of debate within WGII. Some delegations preferred 
drafting which would allow the tribunal to refuse submissions from non-disputing Parties 
– the “may accept” option.271 Those who supported a “shall accept” option argued that: 
the interpretation of the treaty might affect the rights of the non-disputing Party in future; 
the non-disputing Party’s interventions were likely to be helpful to the tribunal; and that 
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experience showed that a non-disputing Party rarely intervened simply to protect its own 
investor’s interests.272 In support of the “may accept” option, it was said that requiring the 
tribunal to accept submissions from the non-disputing Party amounted to facilitating 
diplomatic protection, and could lead to politicisation of the proceedings.273 “May” would 
also provide the tribunal with the discretion to refuse submissions, for example, if made 
at such a late stage of the proceedings that the submission would be disruptive.274 
 
Although the “shall accept” option won out, it was agreed that the tribunal should be able 
to refuse submissions from a non-disputing Party if allowing them would be overly 
disruptive to the proceedings. This is reflected in art 5(4).  
 
There was disagreement over whether the non-disputing Party should be limited to 
commenting on questions of treaty interpretation,275 or whether non-disputing Parties 
should be free to comment on questions of law or fact.276 On the one hand, the tribunal 
might need information on, for example, the nationality or corporate status of the investor 
within the home State.277 On the other, allowing the non-disputing Party to comment on 
legal or factual matters within the dispute risks the appearance of diplomatic 
protection.278 
 
It was decided that the tribunal should be able to accept submissions from non-disputing 
Parties on other matters within the scope of the dispute after consultation with the 
disputing parties.279 In determining whether to allow such submissions, the tribunal 
would consider the need to avoid submissions which would support the claim of the 
investor in a manner tantamount to diplomatic protection.280 
 
The fact that special provision has been made for submissions from non-disputing Parties 
indicates that WGII views ITA as part of a broader international system. WGII is aware 
that the decisions of ITA tribunals might impact obligations held by other States. ITA is 
being recognised as a system of international adjudication, where the treaty-based nature 
  
 
272  Report of Fifty-Seventh Session, above n 191, at [60]. 
273  At [61]. 
274  Report of the Fifty-Eighth Session, above n 166, at [43]. 
275  Report of Fifty-Fifth Session, above n 184, at [87]. 
276  At [88]. 
277  At [88]. 
278  At [87]. 
279  UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, art 5(2). 
280  Art 5(2). 
47  
 
of claims means that decisions in one award might affect States in otherwise unrelated 
disputes. This can be contrasted with commercial arbitration, where arbitration awards do 
not form a system of jurisprudence and with impact only the parties to that particular 
dispute. Thus, ITA is seen as more similar to other forms of international adjudication – 
such as the ICJ and the ECtHR – than to commercial arbitration. Because international 
courts and tribunals are engaged in treaty interpretation, which might impact States who 
are not party to the particular dispute, it is common for these courts and tribunals to grant 
interested States the right to be heard.281  
2 Restrictions on Third Party Participation 
The need to restrict non-party participation in arbitration has been widely recognised.282 
This was reflected in WGII deliberations on how to manage third party rights within the 
transparency standard. 283 WGII agreed that a detailed procedure should be set out for 
how tribunals should manage third party submissions, and that the tribunal should be 
required to consult the parties before deciding whether to accept third party 
submissions.284 
 
That decision is reflected in art 4 of the transparency standard. Article 4(2) requires 
possible third party submitters to detail: the identity of the third party, including any 
parent organisation; any connection it might have with any disputing party; the identity of 
any government, person or organisation that has provided it assistance in preparing the 
submissions, or substantial assistance in the two years prior; the nature of the interest the 
third party has in the arbitration; the specific issues it wishes to address in its 
submissions; and the extent to which the submission would assist the tribunal by bringing 
a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing 
parties. Article 4(3) requires the submission to be concise; to set out a precise statement 
of the third party’s position on issues; and to only address matters within the scope of the 
dispute. 
B Analysis 
Like publication of arbitral documents, the ability of third parties to participate in ITA 
serves the interest of the general public rather than the interests of the parties to the 
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dispute or the State parties to the treaty. The general public is recognised as having a 
legitimate interest in the arbitration, and accordingly given some rights to participate in 
the proceedings.  
 
Third party rights to participate are, however, limited. The restrictions on amicus curiae 
submissions make clear that it is still the disputing parties who are central to the 
arbitration. Nevertheless, the ability of non-parties to participate represents a significant 
step away from contract-based models of arbitration, where no one but the parties has any 
interest or rights in the dispute. 
 
Third party participation under the transparency rules also goes further than is provided 
for in the rules of most national and international courts.285 In providing third-party 
participation rights, WGII is going beyond bringing ITA into line with accepted practice 
in domestic regulatory review, or in international adjudication. There is more of a 
concern to provide for some democratic participation in ITA than there is in those judicial 
institutions. 
 
It is worth noting that the groups which utilise the amicus curiae process are often 
international NGOs rather than the local groups who will be directly affected by the 
outcome of the arbitration.286 It might be questioned whether these international 
organisations actually fulfil the purposes for which third party participation rights were 
established, that is, to ensure that anyone who is impacted by ITA has their chance to 
have a say. On the one hand, the assistance of sophisticated NGOs might help narrow an 
information and power gap existing between the parties to the dispute and affected non-
parties.287 On the other hand, it might be questioned whether these NGOs – which are 
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often based in and staffed by developed countries – will accurately represent the interests 
of local groups. 
 
VI Public Hearings 
 
Public access to hearings is widely seen as a fundamental aspect of transparent dispute 
resolution.288 In recognition of this, WGII agreed that the in camera rule in the 
UNCITRAL Rules should be reversed so that there would be a presumption in favour of 
hearings being open.289 
 
Some delegations said that open hearings were contrary to the very notion of arbitration, 
being inherently confidential.290 Furthermore, it was argued that public hearings were 
likely to lead to undesirable political pressure on the parties, adversely affecting the 
possibility of settlement of the dispute.291 
 
One suggestion to balance the confidential nature of arbitration with the importance of 
public hearings was to provide the parties with the ability to veto public hearings. This 
would be in line with Rule 32(2) of the ICSID Rules.292 This suggestion did not receive 
support. 293 WGII viewed public hearings as being for the benefit of civil society, rather 
than the parties, and therefore the parties should not have the right to prevent hearings 
being held in public. 294 
 
Some delegations argued that hearings should remain private so as to protect sensitive or 
confidential information.295 At the least, mechanisms should be put in place to limit 
public access to hearings when matters of confidential or sensitive information were 
  
 
288  See Joachim Delaney and Daniel Barstow Magraw “Procedural Transparency” in Peter Muchlinski, 
Frederico Ortion and Christoph Schreuer (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 721 at 774; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise 
Johnson “Transparency in the Dispute Settlement Process: Country Best Practices” IISD Best 
Practices Series (International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, February 2011) at 
7. 
289  Report of Fifty-Third Session, above n 147, at [54]. 
290  At [57]. 
291  At [57]. 
292  Report of Fifty-Fourth Session, above n 156, at [105]. 
293  At [104]. 
294  At [104]. 
295  Report of Fifty-Third Session, above n 147, at [56]. 
50  
 
being discussed.296 It was agreed that the tribunal should be able to hold parts of the 
hearings in private when necessary to protect confidential and sensitive information. 297 
 
A further issue was whether the tribunal should be able to limit public access to hearings 
for practical and logistical reasons.298 Article 6(3) gives the tribunal the discretion to hold 
the hearings in private after consultation with the parties if necessary for logistical 
reasons.  
 
If the parties wish to keep hearings private, this allows them to argue that private hearings 
are necessary for some practical reason. Thus art 6(3) provides a possible workaround the 
public hearings rule, possibly allowing it to be undermined in some cases. However, the 
rule is still stronger than it is in the ICSID equivalent, which gives the parties a joint veto 
right over public hearings.  
 
At the October 2011 meeting, it was suggested that, where hearings are held in private, it 
would be possible to publish transcripts of the hearings with any confidential and 
sensitive information redacted.299 It was agreed in October 2012 that transcripts should be 
added to the list of documents to be made public under art 3.300 
 
The reversal of the in camera rule represents a significant step away from contractual 
conceptions of arbitration. The parties are left with very little control over public access 
to the arbitration hearings. Rather, as is the case for publication of documents and third 
party participation, WGII recognises that the general public has certain rights in ITA 
proceedings. This is made explicit when WGII states that public hearings are for the 
benefit of the general public, and therefore it would be inappropriate for the disputing 
parties to have any veto right. Again, WGII is concerned about providing a mechanism 
for public participation in ITA. This concern has parallels within the theory of global 
administrative law, which aims to ensure the democratic accountability of international 
regulatory bodies.  
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VII Exceptions to Transparency 
 
Those who advocate for transparency within ITA are aware of the need to balance the 
public interest with the protection of business and government information.301 
 
There was early agreement among delegations to WGII that the transparency standard 
should include mechanisms for the protection of confidential and sensitive information, 
to ensure that transparency would not unduly prejudice either party.302 There was concern 
that any exceptions provision should not be so wide as to weaken the main rules on 
transparency.303 
 
It was agreed that the tribunal should oversee the process of determining what 
information was properly considered confidential, rather than leaving the matter to the 
parties.304  
 
There was dispute over whether it was appropriate to include an exception to protect the 
integrity of the arbitral process. It was argued that this was needed to protect participants 
from intimidation, and to prevent the politicisation of the proceedings or manipulation by 
the media.305 Some delegations thought this exception was too broad and might be open 
to abuse. 306 Accordingly, the exception should be limited to exceptional circumstances to 
avoid undermining the transparency standard.307 Ultimately, an exception was included 
for when disclosure of information would “jeopardise the integrity of the arbitral 
process”.308 
 
At the October 2012 meeting, one proposal was to include an exception for information 
“the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement or would be contrary to the 
public interest or its essential security interests”.309 There was opposition to this on the 
basis that the exception was so broad that practically any information could be withheld 
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under it.310 As the result of an overall compromise between the delegations reached at the 
February 2013 meeting, it was agreed that no State would be required to make 
information publicly available if it saw that information as key to its security interests.311 
Information the disclosure of which would impede law enforcement was also protected as 
part of this compromise, but is not subject to the same self-judging standard as security 
information.312  
 
The development of exceptions to the transparency standard shows pragmatism on the 
part of WGII: if ITA failed to protect the confidential information of the parties, this 
would drive them to other – likely less transparent – forms of dispute resolution, such as 
mediation. Protection of confidential information is not inconsistent with any of the 
alternative conceptions of ITA explored in Part II: national and international courts all 
make provision for the protection of confidential information.313 
 
VIII Conclusions 
 
It is clear that WGII has moved away from a contractual conception of ITA. This is 
evident at a number of points in their deliberations. First, in opening the discussion on 
transparency, WGII is careful to distinguish ITA from commercial arbitration on the basis 
that ITA scrutinises the actions of States and has sufficient implications for the public 
interest. Second, WGII explains how the nature of consent to ITA is distinct from consent 
in commercial arbitration. This seems to be out of an abundance of caution to prevent the 
possibility of anyone thinking that the transparency rules were ever intended to apply to 
commercial arbitration. 
 
That WGII is distancing itself from a contract-based view of ITA is again clear in the 
development of art 1(3)(a), which prevents the parties from agreeing to derogate from the 
transparency standard; and from the fact that the parties have no veto right over the 
holding of public hearings or the publication of documents. Whereas in contract-based 
arbitration the parties are free to negotiate the procedural aspects of their arbitration, this 
is no longer the case for ITA undertaken under the UNCITRAL Rules. 
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If international conceptualisations of ITA have moved away from a contract-based 
model, what have they moved towards? From the deliberations of WGII, it seems clear 
that the international law element of ITA has come to the fore. Thus, the international 
community appears to see ITA as something more akin to international law adjudication 
between private individuals and states – as seen in the ECtHR– than to private 
commercial arbitration. 
 
This international conception of ITA is evident from the paramouncy WGII gave to the 
consent of States when considering how the transparency rules would apply. It is clear 
from this discussion that WGII viewed the treaty at the heart of the dispute as the key 
constitutive instrument of the ITA tribunal. The arbitral procedure must be determined in 
accordance with that treaty. Any ambiguities would be resolved with reference to 
international rules of treaty interpretation. This is reinforced by the fact that treaty 
provisions may override the transparency rules,314 and that the parties may derogate from 
the transparency standard to the extent that is allowed by the treaty.315 
 
It is thus the terms of the treaty between States which is considered to be the 
determinative instrument in ITA. This can be contrasted with international commercial 
arbitration, where the agreement between the parties is key, and the parties are free to 
agree to alter it as they see fit. Because the treaty is an agreement between States, rather 
than the parties to the dispute, it cannot be altered by agreement of the parties to the 
dispute. Some delegations to WGII expressed the view that the investor’s acceptance of 
the offer to arbitrate contained in the treaty could not depart from the terms of the 
treaty.316 
 
This bears more resemblance to international law adjudication than to commercial 
arbitration. To draw out this parallel, the ICJ, ITLOS and ECtHR will be used as 
representatives of international adjudicatory bodies. International adjudicatory bodies are 
bounded by the terms of their constituent treaties.317 Similarly, WGII’s discussion of ITA 
sees it as bound by the treaty which forms the basis of the dispute. The investment treaty 
grounds the ITA tribunal’s authority to hear and resolve the dispute; it sets out the 
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procedural rules by which the arbitration will be conducted; and it sets out the substantive 
obligations owed by States to investors. 
 
Thus, both the substance and procedure of ITA disputes can be said to be grounded in an 
international legal instrument, situating ITA alongside international adjudication rather 
than alongside commercial arbitration. 
 
This goes some way to explaining the basis for transparency requirements in ITA. As 
explained above, all international courts (if not all international adjudicatory bodies) have 
in place transparency requirements. This is in recognition of the public interest in 
international claims made against States,318 and also an expected consequence of the 
judicial character of the proceedings.319 Thus introducing transparency requirements in 
ITA brings it into line with other forms of international adjudication. 
 
This is also true to a certain extent as concerns the participation of non-parties. ICJ, 
ITLOS and the ECtHR all allow submissions from interested but non-disputing States 
Parties.320 This parallels art 5 of the transparency rules, which allows States to submit on 
matters of treaty interpretation as of right. Furthermore, the right of non-State third 
parties to intervene is recognised by both ITLOS321 and ECtHR,322 although not by the 
ICJ. 
 
It is notable that the institutions discussed above are all courts, rather than arbitral bodies. 
The PCA, which oversees arbitration between States on questions of international law, 
adheres as a rule to confidential and private arbitral procedures. It is thus arguable that 
transparency in these institutions is more a result of their being set up as a court, than 
their nature as international adjudicatory bodies. 
 
One key difference between the ICJ and ITLOS and ITA is that disputes before the ICJ 
and ITLOS occur between States. ITA disputes occur between the host State and a 
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foreign investor, a non-State private individual. In this way, ITA is perhaps most similar 
to the ECtHR.323 The ECtHR is governed by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The ECHR, like investment treaties, establishes a minimum standard of 
treatment which States must accord to private individuals. Like ITA, the ECHR sets out a 
mechanism through which individuals may enforce this minimum standard of treatment 
directly against the State.  
 
Although WGII conceptualises the theoretical underpinnings of ITA as comparable to 
international adjudication, WGII does not explain the motivation for its transparency 
initiatives in terms of bringing ITA in line with other forms of international adjudication. 
Rather, it seems that the driving force behind transparency reforms in the UNCITRAL 
Rules is a desire to recognise the impact that ITA can have upon the general public, and 
the resulting public interest in ITA. In accordance with this aim, WGII sees the general 
public as being the ultimate beneficiaries of transparency reforms, and therefore views 
the transparency rules as granting the general public certain rights in the arbitral 
proceedings. 
 
This perspective is clear in WGII’s discussion about publication of arbitral documents, 
public hearings, and third party participation. The parties to the dispute gain nothing from 
any of these measures: they are put in place entirely for the benefit of civil society and the 
general public. This was explicitly recognised by delegations to WGII at several points 
during discussions.324 Civil society was recognised as the beneficiary of the transparency 
reforms, and accordingly the rights of the parties to limit or alter the application of the 
transparency rules was restricted. 
 
It is notable that in all three of these areas, the transparency rules go further than 
comparable arbitral rules: unlike in ICSID and NAFTA, the parties have no say in what 
documents are published, or in whether hearings are public; and third parties are given a 
broader right to participate than under the rules of the ICJ or the ECtHR. The 
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allowed to depart from the offer of transparent arbitration; at [55], Report of Fifty-Fifth Session, 
above n 184, at [34], Report of Fifty-Sixth Session, above n 165, at [61] when discussing if the 
parties should be allowed to agree to depart from the transparency rules; Report of the of Fifty-
Fourth Session, above n 156, at [104] when discussion whether the parties should have a veto right 
over public hearings  
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transparency rules also go further than most domestic models of public law adjudication, 
where access to party submissions is rarely guaranteed and the ability for third parties to 
participate as amicus curiae is usually limited.325 
 
The impact of the transparency reforms is to give the general public rights to access 
arbitral documents and ITA proceedings, and a limited right to participate In ITA. Not 
only does this go beyond a conception of arbitration grounded in the consent of the 
parties to the dispute, it also goes beyond treaty-based conceptions of ITA as 
international adjudication. Rights are given to individuals and organisations who are 
neither party to the dispute nor to the investment treaty underlying the dispute. 
 
Granting rights to civil society and the general public resonates with global 
administrative law concerns of making international regulatory regimes legitimate and 
accountable. Transparency is a first step in democratic accountability, to the extent that it 
is a prerequisite for full and informed democratic engagement with regulatory 
processes.326 It is might be a stretch to argue that there is a need for democratic 
participation within ITA itself, and this was probably not envisaged by WGII. Rather, to 
the extent that ITA might impact the regulatory and budgetary policy of the host State, 
there is a need for some measure of democratic legitimacy within ITA to ensure the 
democratic legitimacy of the development of policy in that State. 
 
In conclusion, the deliberations of WGII when preparing the transparency rules 
demonstrate clearly that the international community no longer thinks of ITA as the 
sibling of international commercial arbitration. Rather, the deliberations reveal that the 
investment treaty underlying the dispute is viewed as the key constitutive document in 
ITA, and it is that agreement between States – rather than the agreement between the 
parties to the dispute – which is paramount. This situates ITA closer to the ECtHR than to 
international commercial arbitration. Like ITA tribunals, the ECtHR oversees the 
implementation of an international instrument which grants rights to individuals, and 
provides a mechanism for individuals to enforce those rights directly against States. Thus, 
the theoretical underpinnings of ITA are centred on the international agreement between 
States which underlies the dispute, rather than the consent of the parties to the dispute. 
 
  
 
325  See High Court (Access to Court Documents) Amendment Rules 2009 (NZ); Asteriti and Tams, 
above n 31. 
326  Hale, above n 72, at 89. 
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This does not, however, explain the impetus for transparency reforms in the UNCITRAL 
Rules. The push for transparency comes from recognition of the potential impact ITA 
may have on a host State’s law and policy, and the resulting need for some democratic 
legitimacy in ITA. This resonates with global administrative law concerns about the 
legitimacy and accountability of international regulatory regimes. It explains the desire to 
provide the general public with some rights in ITA proceedings. 
 
Transparency reforms aim to enhance the legitimacy of ITA. Whether or not the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency manage to achieve this will ultimately depend upon 
the extent of their use, given their limited application to existing treaties which form the 
basis of the majority of ITA disputes. It will also depend on whether investors choose to 
submit their investment disputes to investment arbitration, or seek alternate confidential 
methods of dispute resolution such as mediation.  
 
Notwithstanding the clear challenges to the efficacy of the transparency rules, the very 
fact that UNCITRAL saw it necessary to implement transparency reforms shows a 
significant shift in international thinking about the nature of ITA. 
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